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Abstract
This paper bears out of a documentary assessment of the 
prime motivations for the speedy enforcement of United 
Nations’ Resolution 1973 and consequent enforcement of 
the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) norm on Libya. The 
study discovers that the intervention was not driven by 
humanitarian concerns, but was impelled by the national 
interests, geo-strategic considerations of the intervening 
nations especially the United States and France. Hence, 
the intervention though seemingly genuine was a 
vindictive attempt at regime change especially in the light 
of its selective character as some other actors guilty of 
grave human rights abuses of which the Qathafi regime 
was accused were selectively left out. The study further 
highlights the flagrant abuse of the Resolution 1973 in 
the marginalisation of the humanitarian component of the 
mission, as well as the prolongation of the assault within 
which infantry and massive armed support were offered 
to the rebels all of which veritably impacts on the future 
application of the R2P norm. The study thus submits that 
realist “self-help” factors were of primary significance 
in the intervention and recommends that military units 
belonging to hegemonic powers; in particular, the 
United States, France and Britain must not be allowed 
to participate in future interventions in the light of the 
chaotic aftermath of previous interventions as evident in 
Iraq and Libya to mention but two. 
Key words: R2P; humanitarian intervention; realism; 
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the tragic events in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s to which the UN Security 
Council failed to respond timely and decisively, there have 
been efforts to further circumscribe the principle of state 
sovereignty to justify foreign intervention when genocidal 
events or massive violations of human rights take place 
within a country (Thakur, 2011). 
It was in response to these events that the Canadian 
government took initiatives to establish the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in 2001 which called for a profound change to the 
way in which the world responded to the problem of mass 
atrocities (Bellamy, 2011).  
Indeed the violence that erupted in these countries 
invoked a sense moral duty on the international 
community to intervene and to prevent possible massacre 
in the future (Carpenter, 2011); yet, the fact that the 
Rwandan genocide was essentially a war between France 
and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) all due 
from the French phobia of losing a Franco-phone satellite 
to the Anglophone minded RPF (BBC News, 2010)  has 
rarely been made clear; just as we were rarely informed 
that Commander Roméo Dallaire was variously rebuffed 
when he requested authorisation to seize massive cache 
of weapons that was eventually used for the genocide 
and that the United Nations (UN) was kept out from 
intervening in the genocide by a French veto in the 
Security Council which also had the support the United 
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States (US) and the United Kingdom (Kuperman, 2001; 
Stanton, 2012; Willum, 1999; Dallaire, 1999, 2005). 
Like the belated UN efforts at saving lives in Rwanda, 
it was when the originally authorised “protection of 
civilians” in Libya turned out to a displacement of a 
people and destruction of their social and economic 
infrastructure that the Brazilian mantra of “responsibility 
while protecting” (RWP) entered the lexicon of 
humanitarian intervention of which Tourinho, Stuenkel, 
and Brockmeier (2016) subsume that while there may be 
disagreements about the adoption of RWP the concept has 
raised questions that will not go away as they are now part 
and parcel of humanitarian intervention’s discourse.
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The US led NATO intervention in Libya has ushered in 
a plethora of interpretations in numerous debates and 
discourses but considerations focused squarely on the 
underlying motivations for the intervention has not been 
adequately exhausted within the literature. To this end, 
this study aims to ascertain the prime motivations for 
NATO intervention in Libya; whether they stem from 
genuine humanitarian motives or whether “self-help” 
otherwise realist or Realpolitik motives are of primary 
significance for the intervention.
The significance of the study bears especially on the 
aftermath of the intervention on global governance and the 
future of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) norm given 
that post-Qathafi Libya has turned out with perhaps more 
violence and continued chaos than post-Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq especially tainting the future of the newly evolved 
R2P.
2. BACKGROUND OF STUDY
The Libyan conflict and consequent NATO intervention 
in 2011 was part of the broader “Arab Spring” movement, 
which began on 17 December, 2010 when a fruit and 
vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself 
in protest against bureaucratic indifference and state 
corruption in Tunisia. This act provoked widespread anti-
government protests, leading then President Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali to abscond into exile. Weeks later and 
inspired by the Tunisian experience, mass demonstrations 
got underway with similar protests erupting in Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain (Ibrahim, Liman, & 
Okoroafor, 2014; Ardıc, 2012; Solomon, 2014).
For Libya protests began 15 February, 2011 leading 
to clashes with security forces. The protests eventually 
escalated into an insurrection that spread across the 
country, with rebels establishing a mock alternative 
government (Keenan, 2011; Cockburn, 2011).
A similar intervention in Syria did not occur, in spite 
of the widespread human rights violations and grave 
human suffering all leading to widespread reactions 
isolating contributors to the literature into a pro-NATO 
intervention group and those against the intervention.
On the whole, the Libyan crisis of 2011 has raised 
issues on the choice of means in protecting civilians with 
particular reference to the notion of neutral, impartial, and 
independent humanitarian action (Pommier, 2011). 
The study however would consider a thorough analysis 
of landmark reports on the intervention to procure an 
objective stance with particular respect to ascertaining the 
prime motivations for the intervention other than taking 
sides with either side of the debate. This objective stance 
would be further concretised with objective stance with 
reports from previous NATO interventions to obtain an 
unblemished picture of the intervention in Libya which at 
this point remains unclear. 
To this end, background information of the core 
variables of the study is provided below to establish the 
context within which the study is premised.
2 . 1  O v e r v i e w  o f  N o r t h  A t l a n t i c  Tr e a t y 
Organisation (NATO)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was 
created in 1949 by the United States (US) and a couple 
of European nations to ensure transatlantic security 
after World War II and to act as counterweight to Soviet 
socialist infiltrations in Europe and ultimately serve 
as Europe’s insurance policy in the event of an attack 
(Gordon, 2013).
The cornerstone of NATO is Article 5 of its treaty, 
which states that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all (NATO, 1949).
While the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) renamed the World Trade Organization in 1995 
formalised capitalist trade against a Soviet socialist 
system beginning in 1948, NATO acted as a balance in the 
security sector against the Soviet military alliance called 
Warsaw Pact. However, following the fall of the Soviet 
Union, NATO transitioned from being a strictly defensive 
organisation to a broad-based security organisation 
(Sundarajan, 2012).  
In the light of this shift, NATO is forced to reassess its 
collective goals and purposes within the context of ongoing 
conflicts in the world, shrinking budgets, and changing the 
nature of warfare. As observable in the wars in the Balkans, 
Afghanistan and Libya, NATO is only able to secure 
sustainable peace through development activities after 
the combat phase. These development activities include 
capacity-building, state-making, implementing good 
governance projects, building infrastructure and training 
local police. This security-development nexus requires 
NATO to undertake peacekeeping in order to ensure that a 
region does not re-erupt into conflict (Sundarajan, 2012).  
With the changing nature of warfare as manifested in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the attacks of September 11th, NATO 
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transformed itself into an alliance with wide-ranging 
peacekeeping missions outside of its own territorial area, 
all in order to ensure the political and economic security 
of its members (Labott, 2010). 
Whereas, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the 
purpose for which NATO was created1 as democratic 
values have been assumed to conquer communism; but 
the trans-Atlantic alliance is not content in securing those 
values only within its area of responsibility. According 
to former NATO Secretary General Robertson, the 
alliance’s new mission was “to build the Euro-Atlantic 
security environment of the future, where all states share 
peace and democracy, and uphold basic human rights” 
(Moore, 2007).
For proponents of liberal interventionism NATO’s 
Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, is a 
testament to how far the alliance has transitioned to 
integrate humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping 
into its mission. The alliance is thus presumed to have 
fought on behalf of democratic principles and provided 
support and protection for Libyan nationals fighting for 
independence from an autocratic ruler (Sundarajan, 2012; 
Gertler, 2011; Pattison, 2011).
Proponents of liberal interventionism also believe that 
the success in Libya showed the international community 
the continuing relevance of NATO and may serve as a 
model of collective action and peacekeeping in the future 
(Sundarajan, 2012). 
From yet another angle the US led NATO intervention 
in Libya followed the lead of European allies and other 
Arab partners. To the international community, this was 
a major change from the Bush administration’s approach 
to the war in Iraq and reduced global concerns about the 
application of US military power, and was a political win 
for the US and its allies (Gertler, 2011).
2.2 Overview of the Concept of Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P)
State sovereignty has long been a fixed and attribute of 
states since the conception of the current international 
system following the Peace of Westphalia (1648). As such, 
states have recognised the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other states as an essential element 
of international relations (Jackson, 1999; Lake, 2003; Doli 
& Korenica, 2009).
Be that as it may, the atrocities perpetrated by the 
Nazi regime during World War II (WWII) shocked the 
conscience of the world, and the once inviolable concept 
of sovereignty began to erode building in-roads into the 
idea that international law should protect the rights of 
individuals, and not solely the rights of nations. This idea 
also led to a proliferation of international human rights 
treaties which guaranteed individuals a wide variety 
1 NATO was created as an alliance of democratic nations to offset 
communism in Europe.
of rights, including life, liberty and freedom of speech 
(Magnuson, 2010, p.255).
To this end, the UN began the reconsideration of the 
status of sovereignty with the adoption of the Genocide 
Convention on 9 December 1948, which opened the 
door to subordinating traditional sovereignty to the bare-
minimum standard of preventing and averting genocide 
(Arbour, 2008). 
With the massive human rights abuses witnessed in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the internationally 
accepted consensus surrounding the non-interference 
principle further changed. The International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), arose 
to further resolve the tension between the competing 
claims of sovereignty and human rights by building a 
new consensus around the principles that should govern 
the protection of endangered people all leading to the 
adoption of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle 
by the United Nations’ General Assembly at the 2005 
World Summit (Arbour, 2008).
According to Evans and Sahnoun (2002) the R2P is 
a demand on the international community to intervene 
in places where entire communities and peoples are 
threatened by genocide, where women are threatened by 
mass rape, and where death and starvation threaten to 
destroy an entire generation. 
In such cases, the international community, in the 
form of international and regional organisations, may 
make a commitment to protect civilians when the 
latter’s own state does not have the will or resources 
to do so. The UN incorporated this norm in the 2005 
World Summit and then passed UN Security Council 
Resolution 1674 in April 2006 to that effect (Evans & 
Sahnoun, 2002).
Paragraph 139 of the World Summit document 
explicitly states as follows:
We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council […] should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications.
While the UN Security Council is the primary 
international framework by which to invoke the authority 
of R2P, the Council includes two permanent members 
(Russia and China) with values that differ from American 
and NATO ideals of freedom and democracy (Daalder & 
Kagan, 2007).
However, the human rights atrocities perpetrated 
by regimes upon its own people in Nazi Germany, 
communist China under Mao, Cambodia under Pol Pot, 
the Rwandan Genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 
are assumed to present more than sufficient justification 
for acknowledging the failures of the static nature of 
sovereignty based upon Westphalian precepts (Benjamin, 
2010). 
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Be that as it may, humanitarian justifications for 
intervention emerged in the 1970s in the cases of India in 
East Pakistan (1971), Vietnam in Kampuchea (1978) and 
Tanzania in Uganda (1979). These acts serve as reminders 
that traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty 
must not form the basis of inter-state conduct, as both 
internal and external legitimacy, manifested as a notion 
of responsibilities that the state owes its population and 
to the international community (Arbour, 2008; Benjamin, 
2010). 
As the international community moved away from 
a bipolar East/West Cold War footing in the 1990s, 
international consensus around the absoluteness of non-
interference as an inherent characteristic of sovereignty 
began to shift. Since the emergence of American hegemony 
at the end of the Cold War, the UN has been able to deploy 
humanitarian interventions, under the unipolar “leadership” 
of the US. Within the scope of increasingly destabilising 
intra-state conflicts including the post-cold war genocides, 
civil wars, and subsequent UN interventions witnessed 
in Bosnia (1992-94), Somalia (1992-95), Rwanda (1994-
95), Haiti (1994), East Timor (1999-2002) and the most 
recent Libyan intervention in 2011 (Stein, 2004; Daalder & 
Stavridis, 2012; Pommier, 2011).
2.3 United Nations’ Resolution 1970 and 
Resolution 1973
The Libyan conflict and consequent NATO intervention 
of 2011 was part of the broader “Arab Spring” movement, 
which began on 17 December, 2010 when a fruit and 
vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself 
in protest against bureaucratic indifference and corruption 
in Tunisia This act provoked widespread anti-government 
protests, leading then President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 
to flee into exile; weeks later and inspired by the Tunisian 
experience, mass demonstrations got underway with 
similar protests erupting in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen 
and Bahrain (Ibrahim, Liman, & Okoroafor, 2014).
2.3.1 Resolution 1970 (UNSC/res/1970)
For Libya protests began 15 February, 2011 when an 
estimated two hundred people gathered in front of the 
police headquarters in Benghazi demanding the release of 
a well-known human rights lawyer. A number of people 
were injured as the demonstration was broken up by the 
Libyan security forces. When general protests against 
the government spread to other towns the following day, 
the security forces employed lethal force. The protests 
escalated into a rebellion that spread across the country, 
with rebels establishing a provisional government named 
the National Transitional Council (NTC) based in the 
eastern city of Benghazi and the western city of Misrata 
(Cockburn, 2011; Barker, 2011).
Within days into the insurrection, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) warned the then leader of Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, President Maummar Qathafi that he 
and members of his government may have committed 
crimes against humanity which ushered in the passage 
of an initial resolution 1970 (UNSC/res/1970) by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on February 26, 
2011 within ten days of the commencement of the crisis 
freezing the assets of Qathafi and members of his inner 
circle while also imposing travel ban on them (Keenan, 
2011; Cockburn, 2011). 
The particulars of the Res/1970 (2011) include: 
 i.   Declarations to the effect of opening up Libya to 
humanitarian action; 
 ii.  ICC referral; 
 iii.  Arms embargo; 
 iv.  Travel bans on designated persons; 
 v.  Assets freeze. 
2.3.2 Resolution 1973 (UNSC/res/1973)
On the 17th of March 2011, barely three weeks after 
the passage of Resolution 1970 the UNSC passed 
Resolution 1973 (UNSC/res/1973) on the state of 
Libya. This resolution determined “that the situation in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security”. Thereafter it 
authorised Member States under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter 
acting nationally or through regional organisations or 
arrangements…to take all necessary measures … to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of 
Libyan territory. (Clinton, 2011; Grant, 2011)
Thereto the resolution comprised:
i.    The immediate establishment of a cease-fire 
and a complete end to violence and all attacks 
against, and abuses of, civilians; 
ii.   Ban on flights and asset freeze of designated 
persons;
iii.  Enforcement of a “no fly zone”; 
iv.  Enforcement of the arms embargo; etc.
In sum, Resolution 1973 reaffirmed the objectives 
of Resolution 1970, giving even greater emphasis to 
the concept of “protection of civilians” and authorising 
governments to use all means, including force, to protect 
civilians in Libya.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Today, almost half a decade after NATO intervention, 
Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it 
has devolved into a failed state as violent deaths and other 
human rights abuses have increased several fold in the 
country which now serves as centre for migrant trafficking 
and a safe haven for militias affiliated to diverse terrorist 
groups. Besides, the conflict which would have been 
resolved with few dead prolonged for several months 
resulting in more than 30,000 deaths, 50,000 injured and 
4,000 missing (Guzman, 2014; Chengu, 2015).
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On yet another count, the invasion and consequent fall 
of the Qathafi administration did not only create the worst 
insecurity case scenarios, it also holds serious potential 
for increased regional instability for the Sahel region and 
beyond. For instance, Qathafi’s Tuareg soldiers of Malian 
descent fled home with heavy weapons of war with which 
they launched a rebellion in their country, prompting 
the overthrow of the Malian Government (Middle East 
Revised, 2015).
Evidently and perhaps more than the Libyan people, 
Sub-Sahara Africa stands out as the biggest immediate 
loser from the intervention in Libya as Qathafi’s generous 
aid, grants and loans, provided beneficiary African states 
a degree of independence from the harsh conditions of 
the Western run International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank (WB); while Qathafi’s large scale 
development programs, especially on oil and water 
infrastructure among other projects, provided jobs for 
hundreds of thousands of Sub-Saharan African migrant 
workers and specialists who remitted much returns to 
their home countries, helping in balance of payments and 
reducing deficits and poverty at home ( Abugre, 2011).
Qathafi’s exit also means Sub-Sahara Africa will suffer 
a huge set-back with the cancellation of the proposed 
Central Bank of Africa and proposed gold backed 
currency that would have rewritten international economic 
history in favour of Africa and the Third World as a whole 
(Abugre, 2011).
In all the invasion of Libya enters as a crime against a 
sovereign state, and worse of all an attempt to arbitrarily 
decree a new international law while deriding and 
dismissing the African Union’s peace initiative which 
was of the view that the aftermath of a forceful regime 
change would be worse for the Libyan people and which 
eventually became the case (Chossudovsky, 2013; Forte, 
2012).
4. METHODOLOGY
This study adopts an interpretive orientation within which 
a qualitative design is employed to source and interpret 
data. However owing to the absence of independent 
observers and the continued chaotic situation in Libya 
secondary data superseded primary data. To this end, the 
former was sourced from books, reports and journals. 
Search engines used include ABI/Inform, ELIN, 
Emerald, Libris, Google Scholar, Spiegel Online and 
the Katalogportal. Key words for the search comprised; 
NATO, responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention 
and Libya.
5. THEORETICAL THRUST
Realism is not one particular theory but a collection of 
theories with the common belief that it is impossible to 
achieve fundamental qualitative progress in international 
politics (IP) otherwwise, that it is not possible to achieve 
a lasting peace, where peace is understood as stability and 
order, Thus, the realist paradigm describes a family of 
theories built around a handful of core beliefs among them 
that states are chiefly driven by selfish motives and may 
act forcefully because there is no higher authority that sits 
above them. This absence of hierarchy in the international 
system is commonly called anarchy, which does not 
mean chaos and violence, but that states are sovereign 
political entities with no formidable check by a stronger 
organisation and the acquisition of power is essential for 
survival in the anarchic nature of the international system 
(Soendergaard, 2008). 
For Waltz, realists argue for this in three different 
ways. The first image is premised on human nature: 
“Wars result from selfishness, misdirected aggressive 
impulses and from stupidity”. Second image is to look for 
explanations on national or domestic policy level: “defects 
in states cause wars among them”; while the third image 
is to find the cause in the international system’s anarchic 
structure: “In anarchy there is no automatic harmony” 
(Waltz, 1993, pp.124-129).
Realists are guided by a number of assumptions among 
them that: 
i. Calculations about power dominates state thoughts 
on a broad note, thus states compete for power among 
themselves; 
ii. There is a zero-sum quality to that competition, 
which sometimes makes it disastrous.
iii. That states cooperate with each other for sure, but 
at the root they have conflicting interests, not a harmony 
of interests. As such there are no permanent allies or 
permanent enemies; 
iv. War is a legitimate instrument of statecraft given 
that power is the most important component of the 
international system.
Among varying types of realism, realist scholars often 
disagree, for example, as to whether states are offensively 
or defensively inclined and whether human nature or 
the structure of the international state system is a more 
important driver of state behaviour.
Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau believe 
that states are hardwired with an insatiable lust for power 
and thus they invariably seek to maximize their share of 
relative power and that states want power simply because 
it is a part of human nature (Morgenthau, 1946).   
Thus, Morgenthau defines success within the 
international system as “the degree to which one is able 
to maintain, increase, or demonstrate one’s power over 
another” (Morgenthau, 1967).
On the other hand, structural realism, otherwise 
neorealism, does not consider the role of human nature 
as causal to conflict rather it focuses on the structure of 
the international state system. To this end, states do not 
engage in conflict because of human nature, but because 
their environment creates incentives for them to do so. 
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Hence, for structural realists states want power because 
the architecture of the international system has no 
centralised authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above 
them and this anarchic nature is the reason why realism 
remains the domineering theory of international relations. 
For example, not many states consider the UN to be a 
coercive force within the international system (Waltz, 
1979, 2000; Soendergaard, 2008). 
Thus, while classical realism focuses on the power-
seeking character of human nature, structural realism 
focuses on the anarchic character of the international 
system. Despite their different motivations, both strands 
shed light on states’ national interests and their desire to 
increase power.
On yet another note, “defensive realism” explains 
that states are more inclined to sit back and accumulate 
only as much power as is needed to ensure security, 
and also work to preserve an existing, stable balance of 
power. Hence, states act much more conservatively so as 
not to create enemies and exacerbate security dilemmas; 
while ‘offensive realism’ explains that states are inclined 
to go on the offensive, wage unprovoked wars, and 
accumulate as much power as possible in order to ensure 
just as much their security as their hegemony in the 
international system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001, 
2007).
6. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS LEADING TO 
NATO’S INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
The roots of the 2011 Libyan crisis lie in the political 
upheavals associated with the “Arab Spring” protests that 
spread from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond in the early 
months of 2011. For Libya the assumed civil protests 
which had begun peacefully on February 15, 2011 with 
the apparent intent of demanding improved civil and 
political rights became increasingly violent spreading to 
virtually all dominant cities of Libya and rapidly raising 
within a few days an armed opposition government, which 
dubbed itself the “Transitional National Council” (TNC), 
establishing a firm hold over the cities of Benghazi and 
Tobruk. By late February and early March, however, 
loyalist units had re-established control over much of 
Libya and by mid-March were threatening to crush the 
rebellion at its base in Benghazi (Bellamy & Williams, 
2011).
In  the  ensu ing  f i a sco  the  UN and  Amnes ty 
International affirmed that violence was actually initiated 
by the “protesters” to which the government responded 
militarily but never intentionally targeted civilians or 
resorted to “indiscriminate” force, as Western media 
reported while exaggerating the death toll by a factor of 
ten, citing “more than 2,000 deaths” in Benghazi whereas 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented only 233 deaths 
across all of Libya at the time (Kuperman, 2013).
In Misurata, the Libyan city that was most consumed 
by early fighting, HRW reports that of the 949 people 
wounded in the rebellion’s initial seven weeks, 30 were 
women or children. During that same period, only 257 
people were confirmed dead of the city’s population 
of 400,000; a fraction of less than 0.0006; providing 
additional proof that the Libyan government avoided 
using force indiscriminately (Kuperman, 2013).
Yet within a few days of the inception of the crisis, 
the ICC sent signals to Qathafi that he and members of 
his government had committed crimes against humanity. 
The warnings were accompanied by the United Nations 
passage of two Security Council resolutions. The first, 
UNSCR 1970 (February 26), imposed an arms embargo 
and froze regime assets. The second, UNSCR 1973 
(March 17), authorised a “no-fly zone” over Libya 
as well as the use of “all necessary means” to protect 
Libyan civilians.
By Resolution 1973 the UN decided that all non-
military means of stopping Qathafi had been exhausted 
and thus called on UN member states to fulfil their 
“responsibility to protect” otherwise authorising the use 
of military force on Libya, consequent upon which the US 
led NATO began aerial assaults on Libya (Nazemroaya, 
2011).
Nazemroaya however notes that in the wild rush to 
destroy Libya, attempts at diplomacy were stifled and 
peace talks were subverted. Libya was barred from 
representing itself at the UN where shadowy non-
governmental organisations and “human rights” groups 
took hold of the media propagating exaggerations 
and outright falsehoods that served to sanction aerial 
bombardments of Libya in the name of “humanitarian 
intervention” while Syria guilty of the crimes for which 
Qathafi’s government was accused was not selected for 
intervention (Nazemroaya, 2011).
Nazemroaya further affirms that from the outset, 
the Pentagon and NATO did not only arm the NTC in 
violation of international law, they also had forces on the 
ground from the start while Italy had opened its military 
bases for use by the US, Britain and France prior to UN 
approval while repudiating its non-aggression pact with 
Libya as early as February 27, 2011 (Nazemroaya, 2011; 
Hosenball, 2011).
NATO’s action according to Kuperman magnified 
the conflict’s duration sixfold and its death toll at least 
sevenfold, given that NATO overstepped its official 
mandate of protecting civilians and civilian-populated 
areas under attack or threat of attack and rather pursued 
a preset goal aimed at regime change of the leadership 
of a “rogue state” while also exacerbating human rights 
abuses, human suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons 
proliferation in Libya and the Sahel. The campaign ended 
on the 31st of October, 2011, with the death of Qathafi 
(Morton & Hernandez-Ramos, 2015; Kuperman, 2013).
7 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Stanley C. Igwe; Mohamad Ainuddin Iskandar Lee Abdullah; 
Sherko Kirmanj; Kamilu S. Fage; Ismail Bello (2017). 
Canadian Social Science, 13(4), 1-12
7. ACCOUNTS OF NATO’S PURSUIT OF 
REGIME CHANGE 
NATO’s aggressive pursuit of regime change supports the 
claim that R2P principles were grossly violated as UNSC 
Resolution 1973 did not authorise offensive action or 
regime change. This became apparent as NATO violated 
the arms embargo by actively supplying weapons to the 
rebels, even as many had links to extremism and further 
violated the framework of the UN resolution through the 
use of British, American and Canadian soldiers on the 
ground (Wang, Kusnetz, & Beckett, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 
2011).
The basis of UNSC mandate for a limited intervention 
stemmed from the fact that Libya did not pose a threat to 
international peace and security. Furthermore, given the 
uncorroborated claim of “massacre” the legal rationale 
was highly tenuous. It is unlikely given Libya’s “pariah” 
status within the international community that it could 
have been a genuine threat to international peace and 
security (Wang, Kusnetz, & Beckett, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 
2011; Flores, 2015). 
On yet another count, NATO used more than 200 
cruise missiles and 20,000 bombs in its operation in 
Libya, besides assaults on non-military targets, to support 
the opposition (Pugliese, 2012); while significant damage 
to civilian infrastructure were confirmed for which a 
rationale was not evident nor risks to civilians made clear 
(Chivers, 2011). 
Furthermore, as the operation wore on, NATO struck 
the homes of Qathafi loyalists, killing women and 
children. In one instance, NATO bombed the house of 
Brigadier General Musbah Diyab, killing not only him but 
also seven women and children. Evidently, NATO pursued 
an aggressive, offensive strategy, overstepping its UN 
mandate (BBC Radio. 1 September 2011). 
Nazemroaya avows that Libya is targeted because it is 
one among several remaining countries outside America’s 
sphere of influence which fail to conform to US demands 
adding further that the so-called “protesters” were 
armed, and when this became apparent they eventually 
began to portray themselves as “rebel forces” and who 
in essence were forces cultivated and organised before 
any opposition activities were even reported in Libya. 
Emadi thus insists that the protection of civilians was not 
the major motivation for NATO’s intervention in Libya; 
rather it was a move to topple a regime that crossed the 
line drawn by imperial powers (Emadi, 2012, pp.134-138; 
Nazemroaya, 2011, 2014).
Charles Abugre regional director for Africa, United 
Nations Millennium Campaign alludes to this view 
drawing from Franco Bechis’ account that, active planning 
for regime change in Libya by the French began in 2010 
when Nuri Mesmar, Qathafi’s Chief of Protocol and his 
closest associate, arrived in Paris for surgery. However 
Mesmar was not met by doctors but by the French Secret 
Service and French President Sarkozy’s closest aides. 
Mesmar later worked alongside Colonel Gehan Abdallah, 
whose militia subsequently led the rebellion and Colonel 
Khalifa who has been living in the United States since the 
‘80s apparently working as an agent for the CIA (Abugre, 
2011).
Campbell on his part raises issues on how 6,000 Qatari 
troops, thousands of foreign mercenaries, and hundreds of 
NATO Special Forces had to be dressed up as “rebels” so 
that Tripoli could be captured (Campbell, 2013).
On yet another count, one may question why NATO 
failed to attack rebel fighters who were accused of 
engaging in acts of torture and execution of the regime’s 
perceived supporters. CBC news (13 September 2011) 
affirms this noting that as the rebels gained momentum in 
the conflict, their actions grew increasingly violent with 
reports of arbitrary detentions, disappearances, torture 
and summary executions In one incident, the bodies of 
53 Qathafi loyalists were found executed with their hands 
tied (HRW, 2011). 
8. ASSESSMENT OF THE MOTIVATIONS 
FOR NATO INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
The Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt did not 
motivate any large scale humanitarian alert following 
the resignation of their leaders unlike in Libya where 
“brother leader” Maummar Qathafi vehemently resisted 
the protests but what was tagged peaceful demonstrations 
rapidly transformed into violent insurrection against 
Qathafi and his loyalists, leading to unimagined response 
from the international community. 
Much review and analysis subsisted during and after 
the NATO intervention as to why the Qathafi regime was 
quickly ousted by the intervening nations. Most of the 
reasons proffered support the thesis that foreign policy 
interests of the intervening nations, otherwise realpolitik 
calculations, and geo-strategic considerations constitute 
the prime motivations of the invaders.
8.1 Geo-Strategic and Economic Motivations
For Chengu, part of the hegemonic incentives for the 
intervention hovers around the demands of particularly the 
US corporatocrats especially as it concerns the erection 
of new military bases which means billions of dollars for 
America’s military elite. Hence, as in the past following 
the bombing of Iraq, the United States built new bases in 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman 
and Saudi Arabia (Chengu, 2015).
Again, following the bombing of Afghanistan, the 
United States is building military bases in Pakistan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and following the 
recent bombing of Libya, the United States has built new 
military bases in the Seychelles, Kenya, South Sudan, 
Niger and Burkina Faso (Chengu, 2015).
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
An Assessment of the Motivations for the 2011 Nato 
Intervention in Libya and Its Implications for Africa
8
Joyce extensively elaborates that besides the strategic 
importance of Libya’s low-sulphur crude, Libya holds 
some 46.4 billion barrels of oil reserves; the largest in 
Africa and given the country’s close proximity to Europe 
it stands out as an extremely valuable oil and natural gas 
provider to European energy markets (Joyce, 2011).
Forte on his part explains that the invasion of Libya 
was not about human rights, nor entirely about oil, but 
about a larger process of militarising US relations with 
Africa and that the development of the Pentagon’s Africa 
Command, (AFRICOM), was in fierce competition with 
Pan-Africanist initiatives such as those spearheaded by 
Qathafi who is strongly opposed to AFRICOM (Forte, 
2012).
Perkins (2011) on his part notes that the intervention 
was more about currency and loans above all other 
reasons stating that:
 According to the IMF, Libya’s Central Bank is 100% state 
owned and holds nearly 144 tons of gold in its vaults. It is 
significant that in the months running up to the UN resolution 
that allowed the US and its allies to send troops into Libya, 
Qathafi was openly advocating the creation of a new currency 
that would rival the dollar and the euro. In fact, he called upon 
African and Muslim nations to join an alliance that would make 
this new currency, the gold dinar, their primary form of money 
and foreign exchange. They would sell oil and other resources to 
the US and the rest of the world only for gold dinars.
The US, the other G-8 countries, the World Bank, IMF, BIS, and 
multinational corporations do not look kindly on leaders who 
threaten their dominance over world currency markets or who 
appear to be moving away from the international banking system 
that favours the corporatocracy. Saddam Hussein had advocated 
policies similar to those expressed by Qathafi shortly before the 
US sent troops into Iraq.
In sum, Qathafi’s creation of the African Investment 
Bank in Sirte (Libya) and the African Monetary Fund 
in Cameroun to supplant the IMF undermines Western 
economic hegemony in Africa. Such moves would also 
mean economic harm to France because when the African 
Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank in Nigeria 
starts printing gold-backed currency, it would ring the 
death knell for the CFA franc through which Paris has 
maintained its neocolonial grip on 14 former African 
colonies for the last 50 years. Thus, attacking Quathafi 
can be understood in the context of America and Europe 
fighting for their survival, which an independent Africa 
jeopardises (Muhammad, 2011). 
8.2 Neoliberal Motivations
For a liberal interpretation of the conflict in Libya that 
moves away from a rigid moral interpretation, one has 
to turn to the democratic peace theory.  This theory 
posits that “differences in religion, language, and other 
characteristics contribute to war” (Levy, 1989, p.83). 
NATO intervened in Libya because of the absence of 
institutional similarities or like-minded social, political 
and economic beliefs (Fernandes, 2013; Levy, 1989, p.83). 
NATO as a collective security arrangement guarantees 
peace among its members but requires assertive actions 
against outsiders. From this vantage point, the Libyan 
intervention was not just about curbing human rights 
violations; it was also about the promotion of neoliberal 
values through regime change. Such a neoliberal thrust 
undermines the notion that protecting civilians was the 
prime motivator for NATO’s intervention and explains 
why NATO looked the other way when the opposing 
rebels committed human rights violations and ultimately 
needed rebel boots on the ground to institute political 
change (Fernandes, 2013).
8.3 Evidence From Previous Interventions
According to Chossudovsky (2011, 2013), the strategic 
assumptions behind “Operation Libya” are reminiscent of 
previous US-NATO military undertakings in Yugoslavia 
and Iraq among others.
In Yugoslavia, US-NATO forces triggered a civil war. 
The objective was to create political and ethnic divisions, 
which eventually led to the breakup of the country. This 
objective was achieved through the covert funding and 
training of armed paramilitary armies, first in Bosnia 
(Bosnian Muslim Army, 1991-1995) and subsequently in 
Kosovo (Kosovo Liberation Army, 1998-1999). In both 
Kosovo and Bosnia, media disinformation (including 
outright lies and fabrications) were used to support US-
EU claims that the Belgrade government had committed 
atrocities, thereby justifying a military intervention on 
humanitarian grounds (Chossudovsky, 2013).
NATO intervened in Kosovo because European states 
wanted to protect their own security, whereas the US 
sought to maintain its hegemony in Europe.  Likewise, 
NATO intervened in Libya because it was afraid of 
Qathafi’s potential to sponsor terrorists again and to use 
chemical weapons against Western states.  To remove 
such threats, regime change became the main objective 
of their intervention which however was a clear abuse 
of the UNSC mandate. This argument is well-supported 
by the fact that NATO left Libya soon after the killing of 
Qathafi despite the continuation of sporadic violence in 
various parts of the country. This blatant mandate abuse 
implies that realism still dominated the motivations for 
intervention regardless of adoption of R2P (Reiff, 2011; 
Kumar, 2012; Kuwali, 2012).
On yet a similar count, the fact that the intervention 
in Libyan stemmed more from realist motives other 
than humanitarian motives has been further established 
from the rapidity of the passage of resolution for the 
intervention in comparison to those of other crisis ridden 
countries, for example, the transatlantic community 
launched an illegal humanitarian intervention into Kosovo 
in 1999, but did not repeat such actions in Syria where 
biological weapons were used on civilian population. 
Meanwhile, in Yemen, the international community 
refrained from enforcing any resolutions. It took the 
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Council almost a year after the start of the Yemen uprising 
to pass a resolution (Resolution 2014 of October 21, 2011) 
which did not sanction any R2P action, but advocated a 
Yemeni-led political appeasement process.
Contra dist inctly,  in Libya where there were 
unsubstantiated claims of genocide the passage of a 
Resolution was extremely fast and the duration of the 
intervention unduly prolonged. It shows that the Libyan 
crisis received the fastest military response of all “Arab 
Spring” crises and those of the ‘90s (Carpenter, 2013).
The non-application of R2P in Syria, Yemen and 
Bharain explains the selective character of the R2P which 
poses a potential fatal risk to the future application of the 
norm. Explicating this development, Hillstrom admits 
that who intervenes where is a question of alliances and 
advanced that the selectivity resulted from the fact that 
Bahrain is an ally of the West and any action against the 
regime there would result in the strengthening of the 
Shiite majority and shift power in the region toward Iran 
besides the fact that both Bahrain and Yemen rank among 
REPLACE WITH THE FOLLOWING the staunchest 
allies of the US in the Middle East region; For example, 
Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet (Forte, 
2012; Hillstrom, 2011). 
9. ANALYSIS 
Several scholars deny the justification of the NATO 
intervention and argue that R2P was not used in Syria, 
Bahrain or Yemen where more egregious crimes against 
humanity were being committed and where government 
clampdown on demonstrators were no less forceful than 
in Libya. From the findings of Ford the R2P principle is 
the Obama regime’s favored formula for pouring mud 
in the otherwise clear waters of international law (Ford, 
2011).
Of primary significance is the fact that Qathafi’s Libya 
had a notoriously confrontational relationship with the 
West and for several years sustained a “rogue state” status 
as the regime variously refused to be a US client state in 
the Middle East, aside nationalising US and British oil 
interests ultimately sustaining the country’s “pariah state” 
status within the committee of nations (Muhammad, 2011; 
Zoubir, 2009, 2011; Flores, 2015).
Opponents of regime change argue that military force 
was not used as the last resort and that UNSCR 1973, 
which ordered the use of force was passed just three 
weeks after UNSCR 1970 was adopted, without giving 
it some chance to work and that military force should 
have been justified only if all other non-violent measures 
have been tried and failed. Thus, the abuse and misuse 
of Resolution 1973 by Western interventionists in Libya 
led to a strengthening of the suspicions by most nations 
of the Global South that R2P is a new cover for Western 
neo-imperial domination and liberal warmongering as 
NATO acted as the air force wing of the anti-Qathafi 
rebels, committing the very crimes against humanity 
that the doctrine purports to stop all impairing the future 
prospects of the R2P doctrine. Hence, China and Russia 
with obvious strategic and commercial interests in Syria 
cashed on NATO’s abuse of mandate to defeat two 
Security Council Resolutions on Syria given that Russia 
highly values Syria as a long-term defenses equipment 
buyer and host to former’s naval presence in the Syrian 
Mediterranean sea port of Tartus (Nuruzzaman, 2012, p.63, 
2013; Dembinski & Reinold, 2011; Bello, 2011; Prashad, 
2012; Forte, 2012; Roth, 2004; Bush, Martiniello, & 
Mercer, 2011).
10. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERVENTION 
FOR AFRICA
The Africa Union (AU) lost a lot of credibility in some 
quarters because it was completely sidelined during the 
Libyan crisis. Pondi maintains that it is unfair to say 
the AU had no plan to resolve the stalemate between 
Qathafi and the rebels because it was completely sidelined 
during the Libyan crisis. According to him the road map 
was clear, firstly to put a ceasefire in place, secondly to 
organise a meeting between the protagonists and then to 
organise elections in Libya. The plan was there, but it 
was not even given considerations at any of the meetings 
concerning Libya at the time (Pondi, 2013).
Be that as it may, Abugre on his part avows that: 
i.   The invasion will undoubtedly turn Libyans from 
a proud people who know little abject poverty 
(in spite of Qathafi’s dictatorship and several 
years of economic sanctions) into a typical sub-
Saharan African type of a few wealthy people 
swimming in increasing pools of desperately 
poor people with severely wounded pride.
ii.   Second, it is not inconceivable that various 
armed factions will emerge from centuries old 
tribal and clan divisions which would inevitably 
be widened and like Iraq, Libya’s change will not 
be for the good for a long time to come.
iii.  Third, between 500,000 to 1 million workers 
from across Africa south of the Sahara have been 
displaced, and adding to the already over-flowing 
pool of the unemployed. The president of Niger 
estimated the displaced Nigerien workforce to be 
in the region of 200,000. Is anybody intending to 
compensate for these losses?
iv.  Fourth, the effect of this displacement is not 
simply that it aggravates the already scary 
poverty situation i t  also exacerbates the 
insecurity in these fragile zones, especially the 
area stretching from Mauritania, across Niger, 
Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea 
and Djibouti. These areas are fragile and volatile 
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in several respects; ecologically, economically, 
socially and in terms of potential for armed 
conflicts. The potential for violent conflict will 
be made worse by increased availability of arms 
of all sorts.
v.   Fifth, the intervention deprived Africa of 
investment resources and undermined the 
creation of institutions that are critical for the 
poorest continent to transform its countries’ 
economies and overcome suffering and the 
indignity of poverty. It has transformed the 
African Union from one representing all of 
Africa to one effectively representing Africa 
south of the Sahara in the manner that Libya has 
been characterized by the invaders (as an Arab 
country), a characterization that the rebels seem 
to carry proudly on their chests.
vi.  Sixth, the military bombardments of Libya 
resulted in the shifting of capital from Libya 
to the invaders. Directly, they have seized the 
assets of the Libyan people2 owned by Libyan 
public institutions and re-channeled them into 
expenditures (Abugre, 2011).
CONCLUSION 
Drawing from analysed data, the study concludes that 
NATO intervention in the Libyan crisis is typically a 
selective witch-hunt of the then Qathafi-led government 
of Libya as the motivation for the intervention aimed at 
regime change of a non-compliant government. 
The Security Council’s inability to initiate actions 
on Syria among other countries espouses evidence of 
selective intervention understandable in the context of 
America and Europe fighting for their survival, which 
an independent Africa jeopardises. To remove such 
threats, regime change became the main objective of 
their intervention (Reif, 2012). This argument is further 
supported by the fact that NATO left Libya soon after the 
murder of Qathafi despite the continuation of sporadic 
violence in various parts of the country (Kumar, 2012); 
all displaying a clear abuse of the UNSC mandate which 
aimed at protecting civilians and not regime change or 
support to the rebels (Kuwali, 2012). As such Realpolitik 
“self-help” factors (Waltz, 1979, p.111) other than 
humanitarian motivations are of primary significance for 
the intervention. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
2 The US impounded US$30 billion of Libyan foreign reserves. 
Britain impounded undisclosed bank accounts and assets, including 
UK£700 million worth of Libyan dinars printed by a British 
currency printing firm, De la Rue, which they are likely to give to 
the rebels (Abugre, 2011).
The study recommends that should the need for 
humanitarian intervention arise in the future it should 
be the prerogative of the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
to determine whether the threshold for humanitarian 
intervention has been reached and to recommend to 
the General Assembly whether collective humanitarian 
intervention should be undertaken. The General 
Assembly would then vote to authorise any necessary 
action. 
Bello (2011) specifically suggests that military units 
belonging to hegemonic powers; in particular, the US 
and NATO; must not be allowed to participate in an 
intervention. Again, the humanitarian force must aim only 
at stopping the genocide, and must withdraw once the 
situation has stabilised, and must refrain from sponsoring 
and propping up alternative government as was typically 
the case in the Libyan crisis.
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